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Abstract
Despite years of research, there is still uncertainty around the effects of mon-
etary policy shocks. We reassess the empirical evidence by combining a new iden-
tification that accounts for informational rigidities, with a flexible econometric
method robust to misspecifications that bridges between VARs and Local Projec-
tions. We show that most of the lack of robustness of the results in the extant
literature is due to compounding unrealistic assumptions of full information with
the use of severely misspecified models. Using our novel methodology, we find
that a monetary tightening is unequivocally contractionary, with no evidence of
either price or output puzzles.
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Introduction
There is still a lot of uncertainty around the effects of monetary policy, despite fifty years
of empirical research, and many methodological advances.1 The dynamic responses of
macroeconomic variables that are reported in the literature are often controversial and,
under close scrutiny, lack robustness (see Ramey, 2016). Not just the magnitude and
the significance, but even the sign of the responses of crucial variables such as output
and prices depend on the identification strategy, the sample period, the information set
considered, and the details of the model specification.
Studying the effects of monetary policy is a difficult endeavour. Most of the variation
in monetary aggregates is accounted for by the way in which policy itself responds to
the state of the economy, and not by random disturbances to the central bank’s reaction
function. Hence, to be able to trace causal effects of monetary policy it is necessary (i)
to isolate unexpected exogenous shifts to monetary policy tools that are not due to the
systematic response of policy to either current or forecast economic conditions (Sims,
1992, 1998), and (ii) to generate responses of macroeconomic and financial variables over
time using an econometric model that is effectively capable of summarising the dynamic
interaction among such variables. The empirical practice has typically relied on several
identification schemes all justified by models of full-information rational expectations,
in conjunction with linear econometric specifications, such as vector autoregressions
(VARs) and local projections (LPs, Jorda`, 2005). However, as carefully documented in
Coibion (2012) and in Ramey (2016), the lack of robustness of the responses to monetary
policy shocks ranges through both identification schemes, and empirical specifications.
Moving from these considerations, we reassess the empirical evidence on the effects
of monetary policy shocks by adopting an identification strategy that is robust to the
presence of informational frictions, in conjunction with a novel econometric method
that is robust to model misspecifications of different nature. Our strategy is in two
steps. First, we design an instrument for monetary policy shocks that accounts for
1Amongst many others, Friedman and Meiselman (1963), Sims (1972, 1980), Bernanke and Blinder
(1992), Leeper et al. (1996), Christiano et al. (1999), Romer and Romer (2004), Uhlig (2005), Gertler
and Karadi (2015). Comprehensive literature reviews are in Christiano et al. (1999) and in Ramey
(2016).
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the monetary authority and private agents potentially having non-nested information
sets, and hence entertaining different beliefs about the economy.2 Second, we introduce
Bayesian Local Projections (BLP) as a flexible and robust method that spans the space
between VARs and LPs and, in doing so, it imposes minimum restrictions on the shape
of the estimated impulse response functions (IRFs). We show that most of the lack of
stability reported in previous studies can be explained by the compounded effects of
the unrealistic assumptions of full information that are often made when identifying the
shocks, and the use of severely misspecified models for the estimation of the dynamic
responses. We then set to study how monetary policy shocks transmit to the economy,
how they affect financial conditions, and how do agents’ expectations react to them. We
document that responses obtained with our proposed methodology are consistent with
standard macroeconomic theory, are stable over time, and seldom display puzzles.3
Identification. As observed in Blinder et al. (2008), imperfect and asymmetric
information between the public and the central bank are the norm, not the exception,
in monetary policy. However, while this observation has informed many theoretical at-
tempts to include informational imperfections in the modelling of monetary policy, it has
been largely disregarded in the empirical identification of the shocks.4 Indeed, popular
instruments for monetary policy shocks that are constructed in leading identification
schemes can be thought of as assuming that either the central bank (e.g. Romer and
Romer, 2004) or market participants (e.g. Gertler and Karadi, 2015) enjoy perfect in-
formation. Under these assumptions, controlling for the information set of the perfectly
informed agent is sufficient to identify the shock. If all agents in the economy enjoyed
full information, different instruments would deliver identical results. On the contrary,
2Our methodology builds on the insights provided by models of imperfect – noisy and sticky –
information and asymmetric information (e.g. Woodford, 2001; Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Sims, 2003;
Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2009) and, empirically, combines insights from Romer and Romer (2004)’s
narrative identification identification and the high-frequency identification (HFI) of Gertler and Karadi
(2015).
3While not ruling out the possibility of time-variation in the transmission coefficients of monetary
policy (see Primiceri, 2005), our results show that the effects of monetary policy are more stable than
was previously reported. Our results are robust to a variety of severe tests, amongst others on the
sample used, the chosen lag length, the composition of the vector of endogenous variables considered,
and the BLP prior specification.
4Reviews on models of imperfect information and learning in monetary policy are in Mankiw and
Reis (2010), Sims (2010), and Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2010).
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responses may instead diverge with dispersed information.
This paper reviews and expands the evidence on the presence of informational fric-
tions that are relevant for monetary policy. We formally test and reject the null of full
information for all the instruments for monetary policy shocks used in leading identi-
fication schemes. First, high-frequency instruments are predictable (see also Miranda-
Agrippino, 2016) and autocorrelated (see also Ramey, 2016). We interpret this as an
indication of the sluggish adjustment of expectations, in line with what documented for
different types of economic agents using survey data. This is the emerging feature of
models of imperfect information.5 Second, market-based revisions of expectations that
follow policy announcements correlate with central banks’ private macroeconomic fore-
casts (see also Barakchian and Crowe, 2013; Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Ramey, 2016;
Miranda-Agrippino, 2016). We think of this as evidence of the ‘signalling channel’ dis-
cussed in Melosi (2013) – i.e. the transfer of central banks’ private information implicitly
disclosed through policy actions, and due to the information asymmetry between private
agents and the central bank (Romer and Romer, 2000). Finally, we show that narrative
surprises, obtained with respect to the central bank’s information set only (Romer and
Romer, 2004), are equally affected by informational frictions. Specifically, they are auto-
correlated, predictable by past information, and may contain anticipated policy shifts –
e.g. forwards guidance announcements.
Taking stock of this evidence, we define monetary policy shocks as exogenous shifts
in the policy instrument that surprise market participants, are unforecastable, and are
not due to the central bank’s systematic response to its own assessment of the mac-
roeconomic outlook. Hence, we construct an instrument for monetary policy shocks by
projecting market-based monetary surprises on their own lags, and on the central bank’s
information set, as summarised by Greenbook forecasts.6 We use this informationally-
5See, for example, Mankiw et al. (2004), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), Coibion and Gorod-
nichenko (2015), and Andrade and Le Bihan (2013).
6Market-based monetary surprises are the high-frequency price revisions in traded interest rates
futures that are triggered by a policy announcement. In using financial markets instruments to meas-
ure the unexpected component of monetary policy we connect to a large literature pioneered by Rude-
busch (1998) and Kuttner (2001) and whose notable contributions include, among others, Bernanke and
Kuttner (2005); Gu¨rkaynak (2005); Gu¨rkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005); Campbell, Fisher, Justiniano
and Melosi (2016); Caldara and Herbst (2016); Gilchrist, Lo´pez-Salido and Zakrajˇsek (2015). Barak-
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robust instrument to identify the shocks from the stochastic component of an autore-
gressive model (Stock and Watson, 2012; Mertens and Ravn, 2013).
Transmission. From a classical point of view, choosing between iterated (VAR) and
direct (LP) impulse responses involves a trade-off between bias and estimation variance:
the iterated method produces more efficient parameters estimates than the direct one,
but it is more prone to bias if the model is misspecified. Because it is implausible that
generally low-order autoregressive models are correctly specified, the robustness of LP
to model misspecification makes them a theoretically preferable procedure. Common
misspecifications can in fact easily arise in relation to the chosen lag order, insufficient
information set considered, unmodelled moving average components, and non-linearities
(Braun and Mittnik, 1993; Schorfheide, 2005). Yet, empirical studies indicate that due
to high estimation uncertainty, and over parametrisation, the theoretical gains from
direct methods are rarely realised in practice (see Marcellino, Stock and Watson, 2006;
Kilian and Kim, 2011).
We think of this as a standard trade-off in Bayesian estimation, and design Bayesian
Local Projection (BLP) to effectively bridge between the two specifications.7 BLP re-
sponses are estimated using conjugate priors centred around an iterated VAR estimated
on a pre-sample. Intuitively, the prior gives weight to the belief that economic time
series processes can be described in first approximation by linear models such as VARs.
Extending the argument in Giannone, Lenza and Primiceri (2015), we treat the overall
informativeness of the priors as an additional model parameter for which we specify a
prior distribution, and choose it as the maximiser of the posterior likelihood. As a res-
ult, the posterior mean of BLP IRFs is an optimally weighted combination of VAR and
LP-based IRFs. We find that the data tend to deviate from the VAR prior the farther
away the horizon, resulting in an optimal level of prior shrinkage that is a monotonic
chian and Crowe (2013) and Miranda-Agrippino (2016) have proposed identifications based on monet-
ary surprises that control for the central bank’s internal forecasts. Differently from these papers, our
methodology incorporates intuition stemming from models of imperfect information.
7Our approach has an alternative classical interpretation provided by the theory of ‘regularisation’
of statistical regressions (see, for example, Chiuso, 2015). Another approach to LP regularisation has
been proposed more recently in Barnichon and Brownlees (2016). A different Bayesian approach to
inference on structural IRFs has been proposed by Plagborg-Moller (2015). Barnichon and Matthes
(2014) have propounded a method to estimate IRFs using Gaussian basis functions.
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non-decreasing function of the forecast horizon, or projection lag.
Empirical Findings. Using our methodology, we study the transmission of mon-
etary policy shocks on a large and heterogenous set of both macroeconomic and fin-
ancial variables, as well as on private sector expectations, and medium and long-term
interest rates. We find that a monetary contraction is unequivocally and significantly
recessionary. Output and prices contract and there is no evidence of puzzles. We docu-
ment evidence compatible with many of the standard channels of monetary transmission
(Mishkin, 1996). We analyse in detail the response of interest rates at short, medium,
and very long maturities and find important but very short-lived effects of policy on the
yield curve (Romer and Romer, 2000; Ellingsen and Soderstrom, 2001). Also, we find
evidence of a powerful credit channel that magnifies the size of the economic contrac-
tion through the responses of both credit and financial markets (Bernanke and Gertler,
1995; Gertler and Karadi, 2015; Caldara and Herbst, 2016). Moreover, we document
a deterioration of the external position sustained by a significant appreciation of the
domestic currency. Finally, the expectational channel is activated: agents revise their
macroeconomic forecasts in line with the deteriorating fundamentals. Finally, we doc-
ument that BLP responses optimally deviate from the VAR responses as the horizon
grows. As a result of this BLP IRFs revert to trend much faster than VAR IRFs do.
This has potentially important implications for the policy debate, and particularly in
relation to the length of the policy horizons, the duration of which is typically calibrated
on VAR evidence.
1 Identification
The empirical identification of monetary policy shocks relies on specific assumptions on
how information is acquired, processed, and dispersed in the economy by the central
bank and economic agents. Typically, even when not explicitly stated, the maintained
assumption is that of full information rational expectation. In such a world, information
is seamlessly processed, agents’ expectations reflect the structure of the economy, are
perfectly aligned to those of the central bank at all times, and any systematic pattern
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in the way policy is enacted is correctly inferred by the agents. Hence, expectation
(forecast) errors and expectation revisions are orthogonal to past information, and re-
flect structural shocks. The econometric problem is thus reduced to the often stated
principle of aligning the information set of the econometrician to that of the (represent-
ative, and fully informed) agents. The two leading identification strategies for monetary
policy shocks – Romer and Romer (2004)’s narrative instrument, and Gertler and Karadi
(2015)’s high frequency identification – assume different types of agents as the perfectly
informed ones. In fact, while the narrative identification focuses solely on the poli-
cymaker’s information set, the high-frequency identification exploits uniquely market
participants’ information.
Romer and Romer (2004) measure monetary policy shocks as the changes in the
policy rate that are not taken in response to either current or forecast macroeconomic
conditions. This is achieved by projecting a series of intended federal funds rates changes
on Greenbook forecasts that summarise the inputs of the Fed’s reaction function.8 The
monetary policy shock is therefore thought of as a deviation from the policy rule, given
the central bank’s internal forecasts of relevant macroeconomic aggregates. This ap-
proach implicitly assumes that the Fed possesses complete information, and that there-
fore it is sufficient to control for the Fed’s information set to achieve identification.
Conversely, Gertler and Karadi (2015) use the average monthly surprise in federal funds
futures to identify monetary policy shocks. Under the assumption of a constant risk
premium, the changes in the prices of federal funds futures occurring during a narrow
window around FOMC announcements provide a measure of the component of monetary
policy that is unexpected by market participants. In this case, market participants are
implicitly assumed to have a complete information set, and therefore their revision of
expectations following a policy announcement is sufficient to identify monetary policy
shocks.
If both the central bank and private agents indeed enjoyed full information, using
either of the two measures as an instrument for monetary policy shocks should produce
8Because intended rate changes are reconstructed using historical accounts, this approach is referred
to as ‘narrative’. Greenbook forecasts are produced by Federal Reserve staff, are updated ahead of each
scheduled FOMC meeting, and concur to form the basis on which the FOMC make their decisions.
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identical results. However, as discussed in Coibion (2012) and in Ramey (2016), de-
pending on the chosen modelling framework, the sample, and the set of variables used,
narrative-based measures and high-frequency instruments deliver responses to monet-
ary disturbances that are quite diverse, and often times puzzling. Furthermore, recent
studies have shown that high-frequency market surprises can be autocorrelated and pre-
dictable by both central bank’s forecasts and lagged information. In this section, we
significantly expand on this evidence, and show that lagged information is also signi-
ficantly predictive of narrative shock measures, and that they too display a non-zero
degree of autocorrelation.
We read these facts through the lenses of models of imperfect and asymmetric in-
formation (e.g. Woodford, 2001; Sims, 2003; Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2009), and
interpret the predictability of these instruments as a rejection of the full information
paradigm.9 More generally, we connect these findings to the growing corpus of evid-
ence collected from survey data that shows that economic agents – consumers, central
bankers, firms and professional forecasters alike –, are all subject to important informa-
tional limitations. These range from information being only slowly processed over time
(see, e.g. Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012, 2015; Andrade and Le Bihan, 2013), to it
being unevenly distributed across agents’ types. The asymmetry of information sets
across agents is an important dimension along which the divergence of beliefs about the
state of the economy develops (see, e.g. Carroll, 2003; Andrade et al., 2014; Romer and
Romer, 2000).10
Specifically, we observe that three emerging features of models of imperfect inform-
ation have particularly important implications for the identification of monetary policy
9Two general classes of models incorporating deviations from full information have been proposed:
the delayed-information models as in Mankiw and Reis (2002), and the noisy-information models such
as in Woodford (2001), Sims (2003), and Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009). Theories incorporating
deviations from perfect information have provided frameworks to understand empirical regularities, in
monetary economics and beyond, that are challenging for the perfect information framework as, for
example, the sluggishness of price adjustments (Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Mackowiak and Wiederholt,
2009) and their discreteness at a micro level (Matejka and Sims, 2011). Other contributions to the
theoretical literature on monetary policy are in Reis (2006b,a); Orphanides (2003); Aoki (2003); Nimark
(2008b,a). Despite the theoretical modelling efforts, with few exceptions, the empirical literature has
seldom departed from the assumption of perfect information.
10As discussed in Blanchard et al. (2013) and Ricco (2015), the presence of a complex informational
structure and of information frictions can crucially modifies the econometric identification problem.
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shocks. First, average expectation revisions (and thus high-frequency surprises) – a dir-
ect measure of the shocks under full information –, are not orthogonal to either their
past or past available information due to the slow absorption of new information over
time. Second, narrative measures based on central bank’s expectations a` la Romer and
Romer (2004) may underestimate the extent to which market participants are able to
forecast movements in the policy rate, or to incorporate news about anticipated policy
actions.11 Third, observable policy actions can transfer information from the policy
maker to market participants. For instance, interest rate decisions can ‘signal’ inform-
ation about the central bank’s assessment of the economic outlook (see Melosi, 2013;
Hubert and Maule, 2016). This implicit disclosure of information can strongly influ-
ence the transmission of monetary impulses, and the central bank’s ability to stabilise
the economy. Empirically, if not accounted for, it can lead to both price and output
puzzles. In fact, a policy rate hike can be interpreted by informationally constrained
agents either as a deviation of the central bank from its monetary policy rule – i.e. a
contractionary monetary shock –, or as an endogenous response to inflationary pressures
expected to hit the economy in the near future. Despite both resulting in a visible rate
increase, these two scenarios imply profoundly different evolutions for macroeconomic
aggregates, and related agents’ expectations (see e.g. Campbell et al., 2012, and Sec-
tion 4). We empirically document the testable implications of these three predictions
of models of imperfect information in Section 1.2, and in doing so we also rationalise
evidence reported in previous studies (e.g. Barakchian and Crowe, 2013; Gertler and
Karadi, 2015; Ramey, 2016; Miranda-Agrippino, 2016) .
In the reminder of this section we show how signal extraction, the autocorrelation of
expectation revisions, and central bank’s signalling all affect the identification of mon-
etary policy shocks in a simple noisy information model. We then formally test for the
presence of informational frictions in the most commonly used measures for monetary
policy shocks. Lastly, we construct a measure for monetary policy shocks that explicitly
takes into account agents’ and central bank’s informational constraints.
11Also, they potentially overlook information related to developments in financial markets altogether.
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Figure 1: The Information Flow
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Note: Each period t has a beginning
¯
t and an end t¯. At
¯
t agents (both private and central bank) receive
noisy signals si,t about the economy xt, and update their forecasts Fi,
¯
txt based on their information
set Ii,t. At t¯ the central bank announces the policy rate it based on its forecast Fcb,
¯
txt. Agents observe
it, infer Fcb,
¯
txt, and form Fi,t¯xt. Trade is a function of the aggregate expectation revision between ¯
t
and t¯.
1.1 A Simple Noisy Information Model
In standard full-information rational expectation models, expectation revisions are or-
thogonal to past information. Unlike this case, as observed in Coibion and Gorod-
nichenko (2015), a common prediction of models of imperfect information is that average
expectations respond more gradually to shocks to fundamentals than do the variables
being forecasted. Hence, revisions of expectations (and subsequent movements in market
prices) can be correlated over time, and are likely to be a combination of both current
and past structural shocks. Moreover, agents can extract information about the funda-
mentals from observable policy actions. In this section we introduce a simple model of
noisy and asymmetric information that can account for all these features. Derivations
of the main formulas are in Appendix A.
Let us consider an economy whose k-dimensional vector of macroeconomic funda-
mentals evolves following an autoregressive process
xt = ρxt−1 + ξt ξt ∼ N (0,Σξ) . (1)
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ξt is the vector of structural shocks. Any period t is divided into two stages. An
opening stage
¯
t, and a closing stage t¯. At
¯
t, shocks are realised. Agents and central
banks do not observe xt directly, rather, they use a Kalman filter to form expectations
about xt based on the private signals that they receive. At t¯, the central bank sets and
announces the interest rate for the current period it. Agents can trade securities (e.g.
futures contracts) based on it+h, the realisation of the policy rate at time t+ h. Having
observed the current policy rate, agents update their forecasts, and trade. The price
revision in the traded futures contracts that occurs after the rate announcement is a
function of both the revision in the aggregate expectation about the fundamentals xt,
and of the policy shift ut.
At
¯
t, agents receive a signal si,
¯
t about xt. Based on si,
¯
t, they update their forecasts
as follows
Fi,
¯
txt = K1si,
¯
t + (1−K1)Fi,t−1xt , (2)
Fi,
¯
txt+h = ρ
hFi,
¯
txt ∀h > 0 , (3)
where
si,
¯
t = xt + νi,
¯
t , νi,
¯
t ∼ N (0, σν) , (4)
is the private signal, Fi,
¯
txt denotes the forecast conditional on the information set at
¯
t,
and K1 is the agents’ Kalman gain. Agents price futures contracts on it+h as a function
of their aggregate expectation about xt as follows
p
¯
t(it+h) = F
¯
txt+h + µt, (5)
where µt is a stochastic component unaffected by the monetary policy shock, such as the
risk premium in Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005), or a stochastic process related to the supply
of assets (see Hellwig, 1980; Admati, 1985). At stage
¯
t, the central bank too observes a
signal about the current state of the economy
scb,
¯
t = xt + νcb,
¯
t , νcb,
¯
t ∼ N (0, σcb,ν) , (6)
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and updates its forecasts accordingly
Fcb,
¯
txt = Kcbscb,
¯
t + (1−Kcb)Fcb,t−1xt , (7)
Fcb,
¯
txt+h = ρ
hFcb,
¯
txt ∀h > 0 . (8)
Kcb is the bank’s Kalman gain.
At t¯, conditional on its own forecast, the central bank sets the interest rate using a
Taylor rule
it = φ0 + φ
′
xFcb,
¯
txt + ut , (9)
where ut denotes the monetary policy shock. Given the structure of the central banks’
expectation formation process, Eq. (9) can be equivalently rewritten as
it = [1− (1−Kcb)ρ]φ0 + (1−Kcb)ρit−1 +Kcbφ′xscb,
¯
t − (1−Kcb)ρut−1 + ut . (10)
Interestingly, the interest rate smoothing in the monetary policy rule in Eq. (14) arises
naturally from the signal extraction problem faced by the central bank. Moreover, the
policy rate at any time t is a function of current and past signals, and of current and past
monetary policy shocks. Private agents observe the interest rate once it is announced
at t¯. In fact, conditional on it−1, this is equivalent to observing a public signal (i.e. with
common noise) released by the central bank of the form
s˜cb,t¯ = xt + νcb,
¯
t + (Kcbφ
′
x)
−1 [ut − (1−Kcb)ρut−1] . (11)
Based on the common signal s˜cb,t¯, agents update their forecasts at t¯ using Eq. (2). We
denote the gain of this second-stage forecast update by K2.
Because of this forecast update, the price at which futures contracts were traded
before the announcement is also revised, and by an amount proportional to the average
(in population) revision of expectations, that is
pt¯(it+1)− p
¯
t(it+1) ∝ (Ft¯xt+1 − F
¯
txt+1) , (12)
12
where Ft¯xt+1 and F
¯
txt+1 are the average forecast updates following si,
¯
t and s˜cb,t¯ respect-
ively. Simple algebraic manipulations allow us to write average expectation revisions
as
Ft¯xt − F
¯
txt =(1−K2)(1−K1)
[
Ft−1xt − Ft−1xt
]
+K2(1−K1)ξt +H
[
νcb,
¯
t − (1−K1)ρνcb,t−1
]
+K2(Kcbφ
′
x)
−1 [ut − ρ(K1 −Kcb)ut−1 + (1−K1)(1−Kcb)ρ2ut−2] . (13)
Hence, in a noisy information environment, expectation revisions are a function of several
components. The first term on the right hand side is the autocorrelation of expectation
revisions – the trademark of models of imperfect information. The second term is the
update of expectations due to the revisions of beliefs about the state of the economy and
the structural shocks ξt – ‘the signalling channel’. The third term is the aggregate noise
contained in the policy announcement, and is due to the central bank’s noisy observation
of the state of the economy. This too can be thought of as another exogenous policy shift
(see Orphanides, 2003). The last term contains a combination of monetary policy shocks
at different lags. As a result, the presence of informational imperfections can severely
affect the high-frequency identification of monetary policy shocks a` la Gertler and Karadi
(2015). In fact, only a fraction of the variation in the forecasts for the interest rate can
be uniquely attributable to momentary policy ‘innovations’. Eq. (13) also provides us
with testable predictions about price movements around policy announcements: in the
presence of imperfect information they are (i) serially correlated; (ii) predictable using
other macroeconomic variables; (iii) correlated with the central bank’s projections of
relevant macroeconomic variables. We formally test for these predictions in Section 1.2.
Let us go back to the central bank’s problem and consider the following specification
for the Taylor rule in Eq. (9)
it = φ0 + φpi0Fcb,
¯
tpit + φpi1Fcb,
¯
tpit+1 + φy0Fcb,
¯
tyt + φy1Fcb,
¯
tyt+1 + vt . (14)
In Eq. (14), the central bank sets the nominal policy rate conditional on its forecasts for
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current and future inflation and output. The narrative identification proposed in Romer
and Romer (2004) amounts to running the regression specified by Eq. (14), and using
the residuals as a measure of the shock ut. Suppose, however, that the deviation from
the rule vt is autocorrelated, and that it includes policy deviations u
a
t|t−1 announced at
t−1 and implemented at t, as would e.g. be the case for forward guidance. In this case,
we have
vt = αvt−1 + uat|t−1 + ut . (15)
If vt behaves as in Eq. (15), the residual of the projection of the policy rate onto central
bank’s forecasts is not the structural shock ut. Moreover, given the predictability of the
process, agents can try to forecast vt using past information, even when informationally
constrained. Finally, the projection residuals will also be contaminated by expected
policy changes. While the presence of autocorrelation can be tested directly, one can
only hope to test for the presence of announced policy shifts indirectly, e.g. by using
factors extracted from a panel of macroeconomic and financial variables that may react
to announced policy changes.12
1.2 Testing for Imperfect Information
The extant literature has unveiled a series of facts that are compatible with the predic-
tions of models of imperfect information. Ramey (2016) notes that Gertler and Karadi
(2015)’s high-frequency instruments are predictable by Greenbook forecasts, and that
they display a non-negligible degree of autocorrelation. Gertler and Karadi (2015) con-
struct a measure of the Fed’s private information as the difference between Greenbook
forecasts and Blue Chip forecasts. They find that both level nowcasts for inflation and
output growth, as well as nowcast revisions between consecutive meetings are signific-
antly predictive of monetary surprises. Miranda-Agrippino (2016) extends the results in
Ramey (2016) to include a larger selection of monetary surprises extracted from differ-
ent financial contracts, and for both the US and the UK. Central banks’ forecasts and
12Also, if the central bank sets the policy rate conditioning on other indicators such as financial and
fiscal variables (see e.g. Croushore and van Norden, 2017), the projection residuals of Eq. (14) will also
be endogenous to these variables. This may show up as predictability with factors.
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forecast revisions between consecutive meetings for output, unemployment and inflation,
proxied by Inflation Report projections in the case of the UK, are significantly predictive
of monetary surprises. Furthermore, Miranda-Agrippino (2016) shows that monetary
surprises are significantly predictable also by lagged factors intended to summarise the
pre-existing economic and financial conditions in the economy. Again, the predictability
holds across financial instruments and countries, and survives a variety of robustness
tests.
We expand and systematise these findings and test for the predictions proposed
above. Tables 1 to 3 report the tests for (i) correlation with Fed’s internal forecasts,
(ii) serial correlation, and (iii) predictability, for three commonly used monetary policy
instruments. These are the monthly market surprises extracted form the fourth federal
funds futures (FF4t), and constructed as the sum of daily series in Gu¨rkaynak et al.
(2005); the average monthly market surprise in Gertler and Karadi (2015), FF4GKt ;
and the Romer and Romer (2004)’s narrative shock series, MPNt.
13 All regressions
displayed are estimated at monthly frequency on all available observations over the
sample 1990:01 - 2009:12. We exclude the September 2001 observation from regressions
involving financial markets surprises to address the concerns in Campbell et al. (2012).
Also, for these series we note that results are not driven by the observations dating
earlier than 1994 (see Appendix C).
Table 1 reports F statistics and relative significance levels for the projection of mon-
etary surprises onto own lags and central bank’s forecast and revisions to forecasts for
output, inflation and unemployment. The narrative instrument is orthogonal to these
variables by construction. The null is strongly rejected for both the forecasts themselves
and their revision, and for both types of monthly market surprises. We note, however,
that the bulk of predictability resides in the forecast revisions between consecutive meet-
ings. This is consistent with the characteristics of the signalling channel, as discussed in
Melosi (2013) and Hubert and Maule (2016). In the first row of the table we note that
all three series seem to be autocorrelated.
13We use an extension of this series up to the end of 2007 constructed in Miranda-Agrippino and
Rey (2015).
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Table 1: Central Bank Signalling and Slow Absorption of Information
FF4t FF4
GK
t MPNt
AR(4) 2.219
[0.068]*
10.480
[0.000]***
16.989
[0.000]***
Greenbook
Forecast
2.287
[0.011]**
3.377
[0.000]***
–
Greenbook
Revision
2.702
[0.007]***
3.719
[0.000]***
–
R2 0.021 0.080 0.068 0.142 0.129 0.100 0.237 – –
N 230 238 238 230 238 238 207 – –
Note: Regressions on Greenbook forecasts and forecast revisions include a constant and 1 lag of the
dependent variable. From left to right, the monthly surprise in the fourth federal funds future (FF4t),
the instrument in Gertler and Karadi (2015) (FF4GKt ), the narrative series of Romer and Romer (2004)
(MPNt). 1990:2009. t-statistics are reported in square brackets, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01,
robust SE.
We explore the extent of the autocorrelation for these commonly used instruments
for monetary policy shocks in Table 2. The numbers confirm the presence of time
dependence in all of the three instruments, including the narrative series. Extending
the number of lags to 12 does not alter the evidence. Also, we note that while the
weighting scheme adopted in Gertler and Karadi (2015) enhances the autocorrelation
in the average monthly surprises, the null of no time dependence is rejected also for the
unweighted monthly surprises.14
In Table 3 we project a set of different measures of monetary policy shocks on a
set of lagged macro-financial dynamic factors extracted from the collection of monthly
variables assembled in McCracken and Ng (2015). To the narrative and market-based
instruments already defined, we add a measure that we specifically construct to be ro-
bust to the presence of informational constraints in the economy (MPIt). A detailed
discussion on the construction of our instrument is in Section 1.3. The dataset that we
14The irregular pattern of autocorrelation can be due to the uneven scheduling of FOMC meetings
in any given year, the only partial overlap of the horizon of the fourth federal funds futures traded in
any given month, and the jagged edge of the real time data released every month by the statistical
office. Additionally, as pointed out in Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012), the OLS coefficients can be
biased as a consequence of the presence of noisy signals. The bias in our case is likely to be negative,
as shown in the Appendix (Eq. A.17).
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Table 2: Autoregressive Component in Instruments for Monetary
Policy Shocks
FF4t FF4
GK
t MPNt
lag 1 0.058 [0.89] 0.356 [5.47]*** -0.048 [-0.63]
lag 2 -0.013 [-0.20] -0.199 [-2.86]*** 0.207 [2.93]***
lag 3 0.090 [1.38] 0.232 [3.34]*** 0.507 [7.15]***
lag 4 0.150 [2.26]** 0.021 [0.29] 0.090 [1.12]
constant -0.010 [-2.30]** -0.008 [-2.43]** -0.006 [-0.54]
R2 0.021 0.142 0.237
F 2.219 10.480 16.989
p 0.068 0.000 0.000
N 230 230 207
Note: Regressions are estimated over the sample 1990:2009. From left to right, the monthly surprise
in the fourth federal funds future (FF4t), the instrument in Gertler and Karadi (2015) (FF4
GK
t ),
the narrative series of Romer and Romer (2004) (MPNt), and the informationally robust instrument
constructed in Section 1.3 (MPIt). t-statistics are reported in square brackets, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
use for the factors extraction counts over 130 monthly series that cover all the main
macroeconomic aggregates, and a number of financial indicators. The factors enter
the regressions with a month’s lag. Results in Table 3 confirm the predictability of
market-based monetary surprises using past information. They also show that narrat-
ive accounts of ‘unanticipated’ interest rate changes are similarly predictable by state
variables which are a function of past structural shocks.15
1.3 An Informationally-robust Instrument
Taking stock of the evidence discussed, we propose to identify monetary policy shocks
as the component of market surprises triggered by policy announcements that are or-
thogonal to both central bank’s economic projections, and to past market surprises.
Hence, we capture the effects of shifts to the policy rate that are both unforeseen by
market participants, and are not due to central bank’s concerns about either current or
15Factors are estimated using last vintage data which are likely to incorporate revisions to early
estimates variables. While this may not be information readily available to agents, it is worth to
observe that in a perfect information world markets aggregate information efficiently, and there is no
role for data revisions and national accounting offices.
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Table 3: Informational Frictions in Measures for Monetary Policy
Shocks
FF4t FF4
GK
t MPNt MPIt
f1,t−1 -0.012 [-1.97]* -0.011 [-2.74]*** -0.103 [-4.13]*** 0.006 [0.98]
f2,t−1 0.001 [0.38] 0.004 [1.79]* -0.005 [-0.45] 0.005 [1.56]
f3,t−1 0.002 [0.41] -0.001 [-0.23] -0.035 [-2.21]** 0.001 [0.29]
f4,t−1 0.015 [2.09]** 0.008 [1.92]* 0.068 [2.71]*** 0.005 [0.70]
f5,t−1 0.002 [0.26] 0.001 [0.12] 0.017 [0.61] 0.008 [1.18]
f6,t−1 -0.011 [-2.19]** -0.007 [-2.58]** 0.008 [0.57] -0.008 [-1.63]
f7,t−1 -0.010 [-1.69]* -0.006 [-1.40] -0.053 [-2.85]*** -0.004 [-0.54]
f8,t−1 -0.001 [-0.35] 0.001 [0.32] -0.042 [-2.38]** -0.001 [-0.15]
f9,t−1 -0.002 [-0.59] -0.002 [-0.53] -0.037 [-1.65] 0.000 [0.07]
f10,t−1 0.004 [0.75] 0.000 [-0.03] -0.030 [-2.54]** -0.003 [-0.70]
R2 0.073 0.140 0.202 0.033
F 2.230 3.572 3.372 2.225
p 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.014
N 236 236 213 224
Note: Regressions include a constant and 1 lag of the dependent variable. 1990:2009. From left to right,
the monthly surprise in the fourth federal funds future (FF4t), the instrument in Gertler and Karadi
(2015) (FF4GKt ), the narrative series of Romer and Romer (2004) (MPNt), and the informationally
robust instrument constructed in Section 1.3 (MPIt). The ten dynamic factors are extracted from the
set of monthly variables in McCracken and Ng (2015). t-statistics are reported in square brackets, *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, robust standard errors.
anticipated changes in the economic outlook.
Operationally, we proceed in three steps. First, we build monthly surprises (FF4t
discussed above) as the sum of the daily series in Gu¨rkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005).
These are the price revisions in interest rates futures that are registered following FOMC
announcements. The daily series used to construct the monthly monetary policy sur-
prises (mpst) are the intraday movements in the fourth federal funds futures contracts
that are registered within a 30-minute window surrounding the time of the FOMC an-
nouncements. These contracts have an average maturity of about three months. Federal
funds futures settle based on the average effective federal funds rate prevailing on the
expiry month, their price can therefore be thought of as embedding markets’ forecasts
about future policy rates. Under the assumption of a constant risk premium, a price
revision that follows a monetary policy announcement is a measure of the component
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of policy that is unexpected by market participants, given their pre-announcement in-
formation set. This is the assumption made in e.g. Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005). We think
of these series of monthly surprises as a proxy for the revisions in expectations in the
aggregate economy that are triggered by central bank’s policy decisions. Second, we
regress these monthly surprises onto (i) their lags, to mod out the autocorrelation due
to the slow absorption of information; and (ii) following Romer and Romer (2004), onto
Greenbook forecasts and forecast revisions for real output growth, inflation and the
unemployment rate, to control for the central bank’s private information.
Specifically, we recover an instrument for monetary policy shocks using the residuals
of the following regression:
mpst = α0 +
p∑
i=1
αimpst−i +
+
3∑
j=−1
θjF
cb
t xq+j +
2∑
j=−1
ϑj
[
F cbt xq+j − F cbt−1xq+j
]
+ zt. (16)
mpst denotes the monetary surprise that follows the FOMC announcements in month t.
F cbt xq+j denotes Greenbook forecasts for quarter q + j made at time t, where q denotes
the current quarter.
[
F cbt xq+j − F cbt−1xq+j
]
is the revised forecast for xq+j between two
consecutive meetings. For each surprise, the latest available forecast is used. xq includes
output, inflation, and unemployment.16
In Figure 2 we plot the original monetary surprise mpst (FF4t, orange line) and
our instrument for the monetary policy shock zt (MPIt, blue line). Despite the many,
obvious similarities between the two series, the chart shows that significant discrepancies
arise particularly during times of economic distress (see Figure C.1 in Appendix C).
Most importantly, however, the difference between these two series is in the numbers in
Table 3, where the rightmost columns report the results of the test for the presence of
informational frictions in zt (MPIt). Consistent with our prior, we do not find evidence
of predictability for our instrument given past information.
16Following Romer and Romer (2004) we only include the nowcast for the level of the unemployment
rate to mitigate the effects of the high correlation between output and unemployment.
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Figure 2: Informationally-robust instrument for monetary policy
shocks
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Note: market-based surprises conditional on private agents’ information set FF4t (orange line), residual
to Eq. (16) MPIt (blue, solid). Shaded areas denote NBER recessions.
2 Transmission
Correct inference of the dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks hinges on the in-
teraction between the identification strategy and the modelling choice. Modern mac-
roeconomics thinks of the residuals of autoregressive models as structural stochastic
innovations – combinations of economically meaningful shocks –, and identifies the ones
of interest using theory-based assumptions, and often external instruments. Once struc-
tural shocks are meaningfully identified, the autoregressive coefficients of the model are
employed to study the transmission of the exogenous disturbances over time. Modelling
choices are therefore of great importance. First, in separating the stochastic component
of the economic processes as distinct from the autoregressive and deterministic ones.
Second, in providing a reduced-form description of the propagation of identified shocks
over time.
Time series econometrics has provided applied researchers with results that prove
the consistency of estimates under the quite restrictive assumption that the model cor-
rectly captures the data generating process (DGP). However, it is well understood that
when the empirical model – typically a VAR – is misspecified, estimates of the para-
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meters – transmission coefficients and covariance matrix alike – are inconsistent (Braun
and Mittnik, 1993). This affects the identification of the disturbances, the variance-
covariance decomposition, and the derived impulse response functions (IRFs). These
concerns have motivated the adoption of more flexible, ‘non-parametric’ empirical spe-
cifications, such as Jorda` (2005)’s local projections (LP).
VARs produce IRFs by iterating up to the relevant horizon the coefficients of a
one-step-ahead model. Hence, if the one-step-ahead VAR is misspecified, the resulting
errors are compounded at each horizon in the estimated IRFs. Conversely, the local
projection method estimates impulse response functions from the coefficients of direct
projections of variables onto their lags at the relevant horizon. This makes LP more
robust to a number of model misspecifications, and thus a theoretically preferable choice.
In practice, however, the theoretical appeal of LPs has to be balanced against the
large estimation uncertainty that surrounds the coefficients’ estimates. From a classical
perspective, one faces a sharp bias-variance trade-off when selecting between VARs and
LPs.
In what follows, we review the two methods, and propose a Bayesian approach to
Local Projections (BLPs) as an efficient way to bridge between the two, by mean of
informative priors. Intuitively, we propose a regularisation for LP-based IRFs which
builds on the prior that a VAR can provide, in first approximation, a decent description
of the behaviour of most macroeconomic and financial variables. As the horizon grows,
however, BLP are allowed to optimally deviate from the restrictive shape of VAR-based
IRFs, whenever these are poorly supported by the data. This while the discipline
imposed by our prior allows to retain reasonable estimation uncertainty at all horizons.
2.1 Recursive VARs and Direct LPs
The standard practice in empirical macroeconomics is to fit a linear vector autoregression
to a limited set of variables. This in order to retrieve their moving average representa-
tion, from which it is possible to obtain dynamic responses to the identified shocks. A
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VAR can be written in structural form as
A0yt+1 = K + A1yt + . . .+ Apyt−(p−1) + ut+1 , (17)
ut ∼ N (0,Σu) ,
where t = p + 1, . . . , T , yt = (y
1
t , . . . , y
n
t )
′ is a (n× 1) random vector of macroeconomic
variables, Ai, i = 0, . . . , p, are (n×n) coefficient matrices (the ‘transmission coefficients’),
and ut = (u
1
t , . . . , u
n
t )
′ is an n-dimensional vector of structural shocks. It is generally
assumed that Σu = In. VARs are estimated in reduced form, i.e.
yt+1 = C +B1yt + ...+Bpyt−(p−1) + εt+1 , (18)
εt ∼ N (0,Σε) ,
where εt = A
−1
0 ut, E[εtε′t] = A−10 (A−10 )′ = Σε, and Bi = A−10 Ai. C = A−10 K.
Given A0, the IRFs to the identified structural shocks can be recursively computed
for any horizon h as
IRFVARh =
h∑
j=1
IRFVARh−j Bj , (19)
where IRFVAR0 = A
−1
0 and Bj = 0 for j > p. IRF
VAR
h is an (n×n) matrix whose element
(i, j) represents the response of variable i to the structural shock j, h periods into the
future.
Despite being a workhorse of empirical macroeconomics, VARs are likely to be mis-
specified along several dimensions. First, the information set incorporated in a small-size
VAR can fail to capture all of the dynamic interactions that are relevant to the propaga-
tion of the shock of interest. For example, Caldara and Herbst (2016) argue that the
failure to account for the endogenous reaction of monetary policy to credit spreads in-
duces a bias in the shape of the response of all variables to monetary shocks. More
generally, there is evidence that policy makers and private agents are likely to assess
a large number of indicators when forming expectations and taking decisions (see, for
example, the discussion in Faust and Leeper, 2015). Second, the autoregressive lag order
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of the underlying process may potentially be underestimated. Also, if the disturbances
of the underlying DGP are a moving average process, fitting a low-order, or indeed any
finite-order VAR may be inadequate.17 Finally, several possible non-linearities of differ-
ent nature may be empirically significant – such as time-variation or state-dependency
of some of the parameters, and non-negligible higher order terms. In this perspect-
ive, to empirically pin down all of the different sources of misspecification in order to
parametrise them in a model is almost a self defeating effort.
As an alternative to the recursive VAR impulse response functions, the local projec-
tions (LP) a` la Jorda` (2005) estimate the IRFs directly from the linear regression
yt+h = C
(h) +B
(h)
1 yt + ...+B
(h)
p˜ yt−(p˜+1) + ε
(h)
t+h , (20)
ε
(h)
t+h ∼ N (0,Σ(h)ε ) ∀ h = 1, . . . , H ,
where the lag order p˜ may depend on h. The residuals ε
(h)
t+h, being a combination of
one-step-ahead forecast errors, are serially correlated and heteroskedastic. Given A0,
the structural impulse responses are
IRFLPh = B
(h)
1 A
−1
0 . (21)
In the forecasting literature, the distinction between VAR-based recursive IRFs and LP-
based direct IRFs corresponds to the difference between direct and iterated forecasts (see
Marcellino, Stock and Watson, 2006; Pesaran, Pick and Timmermann, 2011; Chevillon,
2007, amongst others). An implicit assumption of both the approaches is that macroeco-
nomic and financial time series possess either approximately linear, or only moderately
nonlinear behaviour that can be captured by a linear model, in first approximation.
This assumption is supported by a wealth of empirical evidence, amongst all the well
established fact that factor models are able to summarise and produce decent forecasts
of large panels of macroeconomic variables, due to their underlying approximated factor
structure.
17If the process is stationary, there exists an infinite moving average representation of it (the Wold
representation). Hence, the question is whether a finite VAR representation of the process exists.
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If a VAR correctly captures the DGP, its recursively generated IRFs are both optimal
in mean square sense, and consistent. Because it is implausible that typically low-order
autoregressive models be correctly specified, the robustness of LP responses to model
misspecification makes them a more attractive procedure compared to the bias-prone
VAR.18 However, due to the moving average structure of the residuals, and the risk of
over parametrisation, local projections are likely to be less efficient, and hence subject
to volatile and imprecise estimates (see, for example, the discussion in Ramey, 2013).
In fact, empirical studies indicate that the potential gains from direct methods are
not always realised in practice. Comparing direct and iterated forecasts for a large
collection of US variables of given sample length, Marcellino, Stock and Watson (2006)
note that iterated forecasts tend to have, for many economic variables, lower sample
MSFEs than direct forecasts. Also, direct forecasts become increasingly less desirable
as the forecast horizon lengthens. Similarly, comparing the finite-sample performance
of impulse response confidence intervals based on local projections and VAR models in
linear stationary settings, Kilian and Kim (2011) find that asymptotic LP intervals are
often less accurate than the bias-adjusted VAR bootstrapped intervals, notwithstanding
their large average width. Hence, from a classical perspective, choosing between iterated
and direct methods involves a sharp trade-off between bias and estimation variance: the
iterated method produces more efficient parameters estimates than the direct method,
but it is prone to bias if the one-step-ahead model is misspecified.
2.2 Bayesian Local Projections
From a Bayesian perspective, the trade-off between bias and variance involved in the
choice between iterated VAR-IRFs and direct LPs-IRFs is a natural one. This is also true
for classical ‘regularised’ regressions, providing an alternative frequentist interpretation
of Bayesian techniques (see, for example, Chiuso, 2015). Moving from this observation,
we design a new flexible linear method that bridges between iterated VAR responses
18In a simulated environment, and with regard to multi-step forecasts, Schorfheide (2005) shows that
as the degree of model misspecification increases, and for a given lag length, direct estimators yield a
lower prediction risk than iterated ones.
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and direct local projections. We refer to this new method as Bayesian Local Projection
(BLP). Alternatively, we could speak of ‘regularised Local Projections’.
The mapping between VAR coefficients and LP coefficients provides a natural way to
inform Bayesian priors about the latter (or to regularise the regression), hence essentially
spanning the space between iterated and direct response functions. To provide the gist
of our approach, let us consider the AR(1) specification of (19) and (20) – i.e. their
companion form. For h = 1, both models reduce to a standard VAR(1)
yt+1 = C +Byt + εt+1 . (22)
Iterating the VAR forward up to horizon h, we obtain
yt+h = (I −B)−1(I −Bh)C +Bhyt +
h∑
j=1
Bh−jεt+j (23)
= C(VAR,h) +B(VAR,h)yt + ε
(VAR,h)
t+h . (24)
Coefficients and residuals can now be readily mapped into those of a LP regression in
companion form
yt+h = C
(h) +B(h)yt + ε
(h)
t+h , (25)
obtaining
C(h) ←→ C(VAR,h) = (I −B)−1(I −Bh)C , (26)
B(h) ←→ B(VAR,h) = Bh , (27)
ε
(h)
t+h ←→ ε(VAR,h)t+h =
h∑
j=1
Bh−jεt+h . (28)
The impulse response functions are given by Eq. (27), up to the identification matrix
A0 (and a selection matrix for the companion form):
IRFVARh = B
hA−10 , (29)
IRFLPh = B
(h)A−10 . (30)
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Three observations are in order. First, conditional on the underlying data generating
process being the linear model in Eq. (22), and abstracting from estimation uncertainty,
the IRFs computed with the two different methods should coincide. Second, as shown
by Eq. (28), conditional on the linear model being correctly specified, LPs are bound
to have higher estimation variance due to (strongly) autocorrelated residuals.19 Third,
given that for h = 1 VARs and LPs coincide, the identification problem is identical
for the two methods. In other words, given an external instrument or a set of theory-
based assumptions, the way in which the A0 matrix is derived from either VARs or LPs
coincides.
The map in Eq. (26-28) provides a natural bridge between the two empirical spe-
cifications that can be used to inform priors for the LP coefficients used to estimate
the IRFs at each horizon. Clearly, if we believed the VAR(p) to be the correct specific-
ation, then LP regressions would have to be specified as ARMA(p, h − 1) regressions.
Their coefficients could be then estimated by combining informative priors with a fully
specified likelihood (see Chan et al., 2016). If, however, the VAR(p) were to effectively
capture the DGP, it would be wise to discard direct methods altogether. More gener-
ally, if we were to know the exact source of misspecification of any given VAR(p), we
could draw inference from a fully parametrised, correctly specified model. However, this
is not possible in practice. An alternative, robust approach to the strong parametric
assumptions that are typical of Bayesian VAR inference is the adoption of a misspecified
likelihood function to conduct inference about the pseudo-true parameters of interest,
as proposed in Mu¨ller (2013).
2.3 Informative Priors for LPs
For the coefficients of Eq. (20) at each horizon h, and leaving temporarily aside concerns
about the structure of the projection residuals, we specify standard conjugate Normal-
19Most macroeconomic variables are close to I(1) and even I(2) processes. Hence LP residuals are
likely to be strongly autocorrelated.
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inverse Wishart informative priors of the form
Σ(h)ε | γ ∼ IW
(
Ψ
(h)
0 , d
(h)
0
)
,
β(h) | Σ(h)ε , γ ∼ N
(
β
(h)
0 ,Σ
(h)
ε ⊗ Ω(h)0 (γ)
)
, (31)
where β(h) ≡ vec(b(h)) = vec
([
C(h), B
(h)
1 , . . . , B
(h)
p˜
]′)
is the vector containing all the
local projection coefficients at horizon h. We use β
(h)
0 to denote the prior mean, and γ
for the generic vector collecting all the priors’ hyperparameters.
As in Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997), we set the degrees of freedom of the inverse-
Wishart distribution to d
(h)
0 = n+2, the minimum value that guarantees the existence of
the prior mean for Σ
(h)
ε , equal to Ψ
(h)
0 /(d
(h)
0 −n−1). As is standard in the macroeconomic
literature, we use sample information to fix some some of the hyperparameters of the
prior beliefs. In particular, at each horizon we set the prior scale Ψ
(h)
0 to be equal to
Ψ
(h)
0 = diag
([
(σ
(h)
1 )
2, . . . , (σ(h)n )
2
])
,
where (σ
(h)
i )
2 are the HAC-corrected variances of the autocorrelated univariate local
projection residuals. Similarly, we set Ω
(h)
0 as
Ω
(h)
0 (γ)
(np˜+1×np˜+1)
=
 −1 0
0 Ip˜ ⊗ (λ(h))2diag
([
(σ
(h)
1 )
2, . . . , (σ
(h)
n )2
])−1
 ,
where we take  to be a very small number, thus imposing a very diffuse prior on the
intercepts. One single hyperparameter, λ(h), controls the overall tightness of the priors
at each horizon h, i.e. γ ≡ λ(h).
Analogous to the case of standard macroeconomic priors (Litterman, 1986), this
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specification implies the following first and second moments for the IRF coefficients
E
[
B
(h)
ij | Σ(h)ε
]
= B
(h)
0,ij, (32)
Var
[
B
(h)
ij | Σ(h)ε
]
= (λ(h))2
(σ
(h)
i )
2
(σ
(h)
j )
2
, (33)
where B
(h)
ij denotes the response of variable i to shock j at horizon h, and B
(h)
0 is such
that β
(h)
0 = vec(B
(h)
0 ).
There are many possible ways to inform the prior mean β
(h)
0 . Our preferred one is to
set it to be equal to the posterior mean of the coefficients of a VAR(p) iterated at horizon
h. The VAR used to inform the BLP prior is estimated with standard macroeconomic
priors over a pre-sample T0, that is then discarded.
20 In the notation of model (22) this
translates into
β
(h)
0 = vec(B
h
T0
), (34)
where BhT0 is the h-th power of the autoregressive coefficients estimated over the pre-
sample. Intuitively, the prior gives weight to the belief that a VAR can describe the
behaviour of economic time series, at least first approximation.
Having not explicitly modelled the autocorrelation of the residuals has two important
implications. First, the priors are conjugate, hence the posterior distribution is of the
same Normal inverse-Wishart family as the prior probability distribution. Second, the
Kronecker structure of the standard macroeconomic priors is preserved. These two
important properties make the estimation analytically and computationally tractable.
Conditional on the observed data, the posterior distribution takes the following form
Σ(h)ε | γ(h), y ∼ IW
(
Ψ(h), d
)
β(h) | Σ(h)ε , γ(h), y ∼ N
(
β˜(h),Σ(h)ε ⊗ Ω(h)
)
, (35)
20An obvious alternative is the generalisation of the standard macroeconomic priors proposed in
Litterman (1986), centred around the assumption that each variable follows a random walk process,
possibly with drift. Results using this alternative prior are discussed in Section 3. Also, one could
specify a hyperprior distribution for the first autocorrelation coefficients, as a generalisation of Litterman
(1986), and conduct inference following the approach in Giannone et al. (2015).
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where d = d
(h)
0 + T , and T is the sample size.
Because of the structure of the residuals, however, this parametrisation is misspe-
cified. The shape of the true likelihood is asymptotically Gaussian and centred at the
Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE), but has a different (larger) variance than the
asymptotically normal sampling distribution of the MLE in Eq. (35). This implies
that if one were to draw inference about β(h) – i.e. the horizon-h responses –, from the
misspecified likelihood in Eq. (35), one would be underestimating the variance albeit
correctly capturing the mean of the distribution of the regression coefficients. Mu¨ller
(2013) shows that posterior beliefs constructed from a misspecified likelihood such as
the one discussed here are ‘unreasonable’, in the sense that they lead to inadmissible
decisions about the pseudo-true values, and proposes a superior mode of inference –
i.e. of asymptotically uniformly lower risk –, based on artificial ‘sandwich’ posteriors.21
Hence, in line with the classical practice, we conduct inference about β(h) by replacing
the original posterior with an artificial Gaussian posterior centred at the MLE but with
a HAC-corrected covariance matrix. This allows us to remain agnostic about the source
of model misspecification as in Jorda` (2005). Specifically, following Mu¨ller (2013), we
replace Eq. (35) with an artificial likelihood defined as
Σ
(h)
ε,HAC | γ(h), y ∼ IW
(
Ψ
(h)
HAC, d
)
,
β(h) | Σ(h)ε,HAC, γ(h), y ∼ N
(
β˜(h),Σ
(h)
ε,HAC ⊗ Ω(h)
)
. (36)
Lastly, it is worth noting that by specifying β
(h)
0 as in Eq. (34), BLP IRFs effectively
span the space between VARs and local projections. To see this, note that given the
prior in (31), the posterior mean of BLP responses takes the form
B
(h)
BLP ∝
(
X ′X +
(
Ω
(h)
0 (γ)
)−1)−1(
X ′Y (h) +
(
Ω
(h)
0 (γ)
)−1
BhVAR
)
, (37)
where B
(h)
BLP is such that β˜
(h) = vec(B
(h)
BLP). (X
′X)−1(X ′Y (h)) = B(h)LP , where Y
(h) ≡
21For the purpose of this work, the ‘decisions’ concern the description of uncertainty around β(h)
obtained via two-sided equal-tailed posterior probability intervals.
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(yp+1+h, . . . , yT )
′, X ≡ (xp+1+h, . . . , xT )′, and xt ≡ (1, y′t−h, . . . , y′t−(p+h))′. At each hori-
zon h, the optimal combination between VAR and LP responses is regulated by Ω
(h)
0 (γ)
and is a function of the overall level of informativeness of the prior λ(h). When λ(h) → 0,
BLP IRFs collapse into VAR IRFs (estimated over T0). Conversely, if λ
(h) → ∞ BLP
IRFs coincide with those implied by standard LP.
2.4 Optimal Priors
In our model, the informativeness of the priors is controlled by the hyperparameter λ(h)
that regulates the covariance matrix of all the entries in β(h) at horizon h. We treat λ(h)
as an additional model parameter, for which we specify a prior distribution, or hyperprior
p(λ(h)), and estimate it at each h in the spirit of hierarchical modelling. As observed
in Giannone et al. (2015), the choice of the informativeness of the prior distribution is
conceptually identical to conducting inference on any other unknown parameter of the
model. As such, the hyperparameters can be estimated by evaluating their posterior
distribution, conditional on the data
p(λ(h)|y(h)) = p(y(h)|λ(h)) · p(λ(h)) , (38)
where p(y(h)|λ(h)) is the marginal density of the data as a function of the hyperparamet-
ers, and y(h) = vec(Y (h)). Under a flat hyperprior, the procedure corresponds to max-
imising the marginal data density (or marginal likelihood, ML), which can be thought
of as a measure of the forecasting performance of a model.22
Extending the argument in Giannone et al. (2015) we write the ML as
p(y(h)|λ(h)) ∝
∣∣∣(V posterior
ε(h)
)−1
V prior
ε(h)
∣∣∣ T−(p˜+h)+d2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fit
T−h∏
t=p˜+1
∣∣Vt+h|t∣∣− 12︸ ︷︷ ︸
Penalty
∀h , (39)
where V posterior
ε(h)
and V prior
ε(h)
are the posterior and prior mean of Σ
(h)
ε , and Vt+h|t =
22As discussed in Giannone et al. (2015), estimating the hyperparameters by maximising the ML –
i.e. their posterior under a flat hyperprior – is an Empirical Bayes method, which has a clear frequentist
interpretation.
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E
Σ
(h)
ε
[
Var(yt+h|yt,Σ(h)ε )
]
is the variance (conditional on Σ
(h)
ε ) of the h-step-ahead fore-
cast of y, averaged across all possible a priori realisations of Σ
(h)
ε .23 The first term in Eq.
(39) relates to the model’s in-sample fit, and it increases when the posterior residual
variance falls relative to the prior variance. The second term is related to the model’s
(pseudo) out-of-sample forecasting performance, and it increases in the risk of overfit-
ting (i.e. with either large uncertainty around parameters’ estimates, or large a-priori
residual variance). Thus, everything else equal, the ML criterion favours hyperparamet-
ers values that generate both smaller forecast errors, and low forecast error variance,
therefore essentially balancing the trade-off between model fit and variance.
Empirically, the optimal level of informativeness of BLP priors may depend, amongst
other characteristics of the data, on the size of the time series, the level of noise, and the
degree of misspecification of the VAR. However, it is natural to expect that deviations
from the VAR will be smaller for smaller h, where the compounded effect of the potential
misspecifications is relatively milder. Consistent with this intuition, to set λ(h) we
choose from a family of Gamma distributions and let the hyperprior be more diffuse
the higher the forecast horizon (or projection lag). In particular, we fix the scale and
shape parameters such that the mode of the Gamma distribution is equal to 0.4, and
the standard deviation is a logistic function of the horizon that reaches its maximum
after h = 36. Figures B.1a and B.1b in the Appendix provide details.
3 VAR, LP, and BLP
We start our empirical exploration by comparing the IRFs estimated using the three
methods discussed in the previous section – VAR, LP, and BLP (Figure 3). The matrix
of contemporaneous transmission coefficients A0 is the same in the three cases (recall
that for h = 1 BLP and the VAR coincide. See Section 2.2.) and is estimated using our
informationally robust series MPIt as an external instrument.
24 The contractionary
23The derivation of this formula follows as in the online Appendix of Giannone et al. (2015).
24Specifically, if ut and ξt denote, respectively, the monetary policy shock and the vector of all other
shocks, the identifying assumptions are
E[ utz′t ] = φ, E[ ξtz′t ] = 0,
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monetary policy shock raises the policy rate by 1% on impact. In the top row, we
compare BLP and VAR responses. The bottom row compares BLP and LP. The vector of
endogenous variables, yt, includes an index of industrial production, the unemployment
rate, the consumer price index, a commodity price index, and the policy rate.25 The
composition of yt is a fairly standard one in empirical macro, and matches those used
in both Coibion (2012) and Ramey (2016) for ease of comparability with these studies.
It should be stressed that the information set considered is likely to be misspecified
due to the small number of variables considered. We choose the 1-year nominal rate
as our policy variable as in Gertler and Karadi (2015). Unless otherwise stated, we set
p = p˜ = 12 and use the observations between 1969:01 and 1979:01 as a pre-sample to
centre the prior for the BLP coefficients. All variables are at monthly frequency from
1979:01 to 2014:12. The resilience of BLP responses to the chosen lag length is plotted
in Figure C.2 in Appendix C.
A few features emerging from this comparison are worth noticing. Overall, over this
sample, results are qualitatively consistent across methods: the policy rate returns to
equilibrium level within the first two quarters after the shock, and real activity and
prices contract under the three modelling alternatives. The length of the sample used,
combined with the small size of yt, also limits the erratic nature of LPs. Because many
sample observations are available at each horizon, the estimates of projection coefficients
are relatively well behaved in this instance. However, notwithstanding the relatively long
sample available for the analysis, LP responses quickly become non-significant after the
first few horizons. The width of 90% LP confidence bands dwarfs those of BLP responses,
which are instead comparable to those of the VAR (BLP responses are the same in the
top and bottom row of the figure). In this case the shape of LP and VAR responses
displayed in Figure 3 is qualitative similar. This is not necessarily the case, as results
in Sections 4 and 5 show.
VAR responses are, by construction, the smoothest. Based on the same one-step-
where φ is non singular and zt is the chosen external instrument – i.e. one of either FF4
GK
t , MPNt, or
MPIt (see Stock and Watson, 2012; Mertens and Ravn, 2013, for details). An alternative would be to
add the instruments to yt in a ‘hybrid’ VAR (see e.g. Ramey, 2016). Results would coincide, provided
that no autocorrelation is present in the instrument, and that the same time span is adopted.
25See Table C.2 in Appendix C for details on series included.
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Figure 3: var, lp and blp responses
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top row: VAR (teal, dashed) and BLP (blue, solid) impulse responses. bottom row: LP (orange,
dash-dotted) and BLP (blue, solid) impulse responses. Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
ahead model iterated forward, VAR responses naturally also have tighter bands than
LP do (Eq. 28). This feature, however, also results in VARs implying stronger and
more persistent effects than BLPs (and LPs) do. Conditional on a very similar path for
the policy rate response, BLP-IRFs tend to revert to equilibrium faster than VAR-IRFs
do, and tend to imply richer adjustment dynamics. This may indicate that some of
the characteristics of the responses of the VAR may depend on the dynamic restrictions
imposed by the recursive structure, rather then being genuine features of the data. The
blue bars in Figure 4 display the optimal prior shrinkage hyperparameters that maximise
p(λ(h)|y(h)) for h = 2, . . . , 24 in the BLP responses in Figure 3. The VAR prior is
optimally loosened as the horizon increases, suggesting that VAR responses tend to be
progressively rejected by the data. In particular, we observe that BLP peak responses
are registered significantly earlier than VAR peaks, and are often realised within the first
year after the shock. This again holding an equivalent shape for the policy rate response
across the two methods. The discussion in the next section explores the deviation from
the VAR prior further, and shows that, again holding everything else fixed, the iterative
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Figure 4: optimal prior tightness
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Note: The orange bar is the optimal shrinkage of the Litterman (1986) prior for the VAR coefficients
at h = 1. Blue bars are for the optimal tightness of the VAR prior for BLP coefficients for h > 1.
nature of VAR responses can at times contribute to the emergence of puzzles which are
absent in BLP responses.
Finally, we explore the role of our choice for the prior mean in Figure 5. Here, the
dashed lines are BLP responses obtained by replacing at each horizon h the VAR(12)
prior with a simpler univariate autoregressive (AR) prior in the spirit of Litterman
(1986). BLP responses with our preferred VAR prior are the solid blue lines, and are
the same as in Figure 3. We note that BLP responses are robust to the choice of the
prior for the LP coefficients. However, the AR prior potentially discards important
information in the off-diagonal entries of the matrices of autoregressive coefficients that
are relevant for the dynamic responses of correlated variables to the shock.
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Figure 5: blp responses: VAR vs RW prior
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Note: BLP(12) with RW prior (teal, dashed), and BLP(12) with VAR(12) prior (blue, solid). 1979:2014.
Pre-Sample 1969:1979.
4 On the Emergence of Puzzles
In this section we document how much of the lack of stability reported in previous
studies can be explained by the compounded effects of the assumptions of full inform-
ation that are commonly made when identifying monetary policy shocks, and the use
of severely misspecified models for the estimation of the dynamic responses. To disen-
tangle the contributions, we compare responses to shocks obtained either by using the
same empirical specification and changing the external instrument, or using the same
(informationally-robust) instrument and changing the empirical specification. All other
features are kept fixed and in line with the ones adopted in the previous section.
4.1 The Role of Different Identifying Assumptions
The IRFs in Figure 6 depict responses obtained using different identifications and the
same empirical specification (BLP). The contractionary monetary policy shock is norm-
alised in all cases to induce a 1% increase in the policy rate on impact, and the sample
used for the estimation is 1979:1 to 2014:12. The difference among the IRFs reported
in the charts lies in the informational assumptions made in order to identify the shock.
The dashed teal lines report the responses to a monetary policy shock identified using
the average market surprises surrounding the policy announcements as in Gertler and
35
Figure 6: blp responses to monetary policy shock under different
identifications
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Note: Shock identified with Gertler and Karadi (2015)’s average monthly market surprise (teal, dashed),
extended narrative measure of Romer and Romer (2004) (orange, dash-dotted), informationally robust
MPIt series (dark blue lines). The shock is normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the
1-year rate. Sample 1979:1 - 2014:12. BLP (6) with VAR(12) prior over 1969:01 - 1979:01. Shaded
areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
Table 4: Reliability of alternative instruments
MPIt FF4
GK
t MPNt
F statistic 9.571 [5.581 11.256] 13.147 [5.354 18.954] 61.167 [49.090 68.549]
reliability 0.074 [0.056 0.081] 0.070 [0.038 0.094] 0.267 [0.223 0.294]
Note: top row: F statistics of the stage-1 regression of the reduced-form innovations on the instrument.
bottom row: reliability of the instrument. 90% confidence intervals in square brackets.
Karadi (2015) – FF4GKt . The orange (dash-dotted) lines, on the other hand, are re-
sponses to shocks identified using the narrative instrument of Romer and Romer (2004)
– MPNt. Lastly, the blue solid lines indicate the effects of a monetary disturbance
identified using the informationally robust instrument proposed in Section 1.3, MPIt.
In each case, we use these series as external instruments for the identification.26
A few features are noteworthy. First, both the narrative and Gertler and Karadi
(2015)’s high-frequency instruments imply a much more persistent response for the
policy rate compared to our new measure. The response of the policy rate is still
26In each case, we use the common sample between the VAR innovations and the external instrument
to estimate the relevant entries of A0.
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significant 20 months after the shock, and is nearly identical in the two cases. Second,
and quite crucially, both instruments induce significant and long lived real activity
puzzles. Third, while the average market surprise elicits an immediate contraction in
prices, the narrative series triggers a sustained price puzzle. Similar evidence is doc-
umented in Ramey (2016) and Miranda-Agrippino (2016). Consistent with standard
macroeconomic theory, on the other hand, our instrument identifies a contractionary
monetary policy shock that induces a contraction in output, a rise in unemployment,
and a reduction in prices. As noted, in a full-information rational expectation setting,
the use of either instrument should deliver identical results. Conversely, and holding
fixed the specification of the VAR/BLP, the heterogeneity of the responses in Figure
6 can be thought of as an indirect indication of the different informational content of
the three instruments. In particular, responses seem to confirm that both the narrative
and high-frequency instruments are autocorrelated and not orthogonal to the state of
the economy (see Section 1.2). As discussed, the signalling channel of monetary policy
– i.e. the information transferred by the central bank to private agents via policy ac-
tions – can contaminate high-frequency instruments thereby inducing empirical puzzles.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the heterogeneity of the responses, and relative puzz-
ling outcomes, are a strong indication of the contamination of the high-frequency and
the narrative instrument by other macroeconomic shocks. While this casts a shade on
the exogeneity of the instruments, it can explain the statistical results on their relevance
(Table 4).
4.2 The Role of Different Modelling Choices
Figure 7 compares the responses obtained using VAR, LP and BLP over a set of 24-year
subsamples from 1981 to 2014, using our novel instrument. The information set used in
this exercise is reduced by choice to the core of the macroeconomic variables virtually
employed in all the empirical applications in the literature. As such, it discards many
variables potentially important in the transmission of monetary policy shocks in the
37
Figure 7: var, blp and lp responses across subsamples
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Note: top row: VAR(12) (blue, solid), and BLP(12) (grey, area) responses. bottom row: LP(12)
(orange, solid), and BLP(12) (grey, area) responses. Subsamples 1981:2005, 1982:2006, ..., 1990:2014.
economy, hence amplifying the information set misspecification of the system.27 This
specification is helpful to assess how different methods cope with potentially severely
misspecified models and short samples. Indeed, it can be thought of as a severe test on
the robustness of BLP with respect to model bias. In all cases A0 is estimated using
the MPI series as an external instrument. The blue lines in the top row of the figure
are the VAR responses for each of the subsamples. Similarly, the orange lines in the
bottom row are LP responses in each of the subsamples. Conversely, the grey areas in
both rows cover all the space occupied by the BLP responses in those same sub-periods.
We abstract from estimation uncertainty.
Again, a few elements are worth attention. First, the responses of the policy variable
27With respect to the previous specification, here we drop the commodity price index that has large
instabilities over the subsamples considered, and could appear as a confounding factor in the analysis.
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Figure 8: var, blp and lp responses across subsamples
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Note: BLP (12) with VAR(12) prior (blue, solid), VAR(12) (teal, dotted) and LP (12) (orange, dash-
dotted) responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock. top row: estimation sample 1990:01 -
2012:12, pre-sample 1969:01 - 1979:12. bottom row: estimation sample 1983:01 - 2007:12, pre-sample
1969:01 - 1982:12.
are markedly more persistent when estimated with a VAR. In a number of occasions,
moreover, the policy rate stays above the 1% impact increase for over a year. Second,
the reaction of real variables to a monetary contraction is decisively recessionary for
BLP. The same does not hold for VAR responses which, in some cases, lead to puzzling
expansionary effects, with production increasing and unemployment decreasing after
the shock. Additionally, even when of the ‘correct’ sign, some of the VAR responses for
these two variables seem to imply equally puzzling exploding behaviours. Lastly, we note
that BLP responses for prices display a less clear-cut interpretation over longer horizons.
Conversely, VAR responses in equivalent subsamples imply strong price puzzles. Turning
the attention to the bottom row of the figure, we see how the erratic nature of LP
responses is exacerbated by the small samples used. In particular, we note that LP too
can lead to puzzling responses for both production and unemployment in some instances.
In a further robustness check, we test the behaviour of BLP focusing on two subsamples
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which have been recognised as being particularly problematic because of either output or
price puzzles (see e.g. Ramey, 2016). In the top row of Figure 8, IRFs are estimated over
the period 1990:01 - 2012:12, while those in the bottom row refer to the years 1983:01 -
2007:12. In both cases BLP responses register a contraction of output and prices, and a
muted response of unemployment. Importantly, the same does not hold for both VAR
and LP IRFs. Our experiments confirm that BLP can sensibly reduce the impact of
compounded biases over the horizons, effectively dealing with model misspecifications.
5 The Transmission of Monetary Disturbances
Monetary policy decisions are thought to affect economic activity and inflation through
several channels, collectively known as the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
In this section we report our empirical results on the effects of monetary policy shocks
on a large number of variables, and provide evidence compatible with the activation
of several of the potential channels that have been discussed in the literature (see e.g.
Mishkin, 1996; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995, for a review).28 As before, monetary policy
shocks are identified by using the instrument defined in Section 1.3. Results, in the form
of dynamic responses and obtained using the BLP approach, are presented in Figures 9
to 11. Unless otherwise specified, responses are from a BLP (6) estimated from 1979:01
to 2014:12. As in the previous section, prior beliefs for the local projections are obtained
from a VAR(12) estimated over the pre-sample 1969:01 - 1979:01. A0 is estimated over
the sample common to the external instrument (MPIt) and the VAR innovations. The
shock is normalised to raise the 1-year rate (policy variable) by 1%. Shaded areas are
90% posterior coverage bands.29
In line with results shown in previous sections, a contractionary monetary policy
28Increasing the conditioning set of variables is likely to reduce the model misspecifications by
including variables relevant to the transmission of disturbances. Also, it allows for a landscape view of
the effects of monetary shocks.
29We set p˜ = 6 to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated in this large specification, hence
controlling for the risk of over parametrisation in LP. As previously discussed, results are robust to the
lag length. VAR and LP responses are displayed in Appendix C. Variables used are listed in Table C.2.
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shock is unequivocally and significantly recessionary also in a larger model (Figure 9).
Tight monetary policy depresses real activity and reduces prices. Production, capacity
utilisation, and inventories all contract, with peak effects often realised within the first
year following the shock. The labour market is also significantly and negatively affected,
but with delay. Both the unemployment rate and total hours worked display muted
responses on impact, with peak effects realised after two quarters. This is suggestive
of the presence of frictions in the labour market, such as contractual obligations, which
delay the adjustments. Wages too take about a quarter before they start shrinking.
Conversely, the contraction in prices, whether measured using the CPI index or the
personal consumption deflator, is typically more sudden, with non persistent effects. In
line with models of imperfect information and model in which a number of both real
and nominal frictions are at play (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007), the prices do not fully
adjust on impact but keep sliding over a few months to reach a negative peak of about
half a percentage point within the first six months after the shock.
Real income suffers a prolonged contraction that survives for over a year after the
shock. Consumption and investment spending both contract, dragging aggregate de-
mand down. Real durable consumption increases slightly on impact, to shrink by about
2% after the first quarter. The initial response of real durable consumption is likely
due to the stickiness of consumers’ plans on durable goods, combined with the drop in
prices. Nondurable consumption seems to be less affected by the shock.
The shock induces a significant impact rotation of the yield curve whereby for a
1% rise in the 1-year rate, we see up to a 50 basis point contraction in the term spread
(Figure 9). Both responses are sudden and temporary: the increase in the policy variable
dissipates completely within the first two quarters. We explore further the details of
the responses of interest rates at different maturities in Figure 10. Here each subplot
is horizon-specific, and maturities (in years) are reported on the horizontal axes. All
interest rates rise on impact with responses that are both smaller in magnitude and
quicker to revert to trend the higher the maturity. The long end of the yield curve
(20-year rate) does not move, in line with what expected for the effects of a temporary
monetary contraction (see also discussion in Romer and Romer, 2000; Ellingsen and
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Soderstrom, 2001). All the curve’s responses are not significant at the two-year horizon,
with a slightly negative median response. This could be taken as a weak indication of
the the endogenous reaction of the central bank to the swift weakening of the economic
outlook.
To better understand the strong real effects discussed above, particularly in light of
the relatively muted movements of the long end of the curve, we investigate the responses
of financial and credit variables. The effects reported in Figure 9 are consistent with
a deterioration of household wealth working through both a reduction of labor income,
and of financial wealth. The decline in financial wealth is likely the product of negative
valuation effects triggered by the contraction in asset prices. The reaction of asset prices
is spread across different asset classes. House prices fall and the stock market suffers
important losses. Housing investment collapse, with immediate falls well beyond the
10% mark. These effects have a detrimental impact on both equity and assets valuation,
making collaterals become more costly.
The strong effects on both real activity and output are likely magnified by the re-
action of credit and financial markets, consistently with the ‘financial accelerator’ hy-
pothesis and the existence of a credit channel for monetary policy (Bernanke et al.,
1999). Lending dips significantly, particularly so for businesses. This is consistent with
a number of possible mechanisms, all of which find some degree of support. On the
one hand, it is the supply of credit that shrinks. Bank lending can contract for several
reasons. First, contractionary monetary policy reduces cash flows and increases indirect
expenses, with direct effects on the amount of new loans granted. Second, through its
effect on asset prices, contractionary policy has a direct valuation effect on lenders’ bal-
ance sheets. Higher rates mean lower net margins, and thus lower profits going forward.
Also, the drop in asset prices can imply a reduction in bank capital which may in turn
induce deleveraging in the form of less credit supplied (see Boivin et al., 2010). On the
other hand, however, the demand for credit may slow down due to borrowers being less
willing to undertake new investment projects. One important reason why this may be
the case is that borrowing costs rise. Following the shock, corporate bond spreads and
premia both significantly rise on impact, and remain high for about half a year. This
42
is consistent with a surge in the external finance premium, that is, the wedge between
external (e.g. equity/debt issuance) and internal (e.g. retained earnings) funding costs
(see Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Gertler and Karadi, 2015). Opposite to what dis-
cussed above, this mechanism operates through the borrowers’ balance sheet: the lower
the borrower’s net worth, the higher the finance premium. Variations in the net worth
affect investment and spending decisions, with magnifying effects on borrowing costs,
real spending and real activity. The mechanism affects both businesses and households
alike. The fall in house prices, the contraction in housing investments, and the sharp
and sudden increase in mortgage spreads all concur to curtail lending to households as
well.30
After the shock, the dollar appreciates suddenly, and in real terms, against a basket
of foreign currencies. This appears to also activate an exchange rate channel. In fact,
exports become more costly due to the appreciation, and contract as a result. Notwith-
standing the stronger purchasing power sustained by the appreciation of the domestic
currency, the ensuing recession, accompanied by a contraction of internal demand, also
makes imports contract, and significantly so. Overall, the external position tends to
deteriorate slightly over the first year.
While the sign and magnitude of the effects discussed so far is largely consistent with
standard macroeconomic theory, the BLP approach allows us to uncover effects with an
average duration that is significantly shorter than what was previously reported. BLPs,
optimised at each horizon to better model variables’ responses, lack the persistence that
the recursive nature of the VAR approach forces on the estimated IRFs. Figure 9 shows
that, with the exception of very few cases, all variables are back to trend levels within
a year after the shock. This can have potentially important implications for the policy
debate, and in particular for what concerns the adequateness of the policy horizon, the
duration of which is typically calibrated based on VAR evidence.
As observed in Woodford (2011), modern monetary policy is not simply a matter of
controlling overnight interest rates, but rather one of shaping market expectations of the
30The response of mortgage spreads is calculated over a shorter sample (1990:01 - 2014:12) due to
data being available only since the late seventies. The observations from 1979:01 to 1989:12 inform the
BLP prior in this case.
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forward path of interest rates, inflation and income. To study how agents’ expectations
respond to policy changes, we augment a set of variables relevant for the analysis of the
standard interest rate channel with Consensus Economics forecast data.31 Each month,
experts from public and private economic institutions – mostly investment banks and
economic research institutes –, are surveyed about their projections for the main mac-
roeconomic and financial variables. Neither central banks nor governments participate
in the survey. Survey respondents contribute fixed-event forecasts relative to realisations
in the current and the following calendar year. To avoid issues relative to the forecast
horizon shrinking as the survey date approaches the end of each year, we approximate
median one-year-ahead forecasts as a weighted average of median fixed-event annual
forecasts.32
The responses to the identified monetary policy shock are collected in Figure 11.
Industrial production and CPI are converted to year-on-year growth rates for ease of
comparison, to match the forecasts units. Agents’ median expectations adjust in line
with the deteriorating fundamentals. It is important to stress here that this result fol-
lows only once the effects of signalling are appropriately accounted for. Conversely,
as documented in Campbell et al. (2012, 2016) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2013),
identifying disturbances using instruments that do not control for such a transfer of
information, makes expectations adjust in the ‘wrong’ direction, as agents interpret the
interest rate move as an endogenous policy reaction to stronger than expected economic
developments. Consistent with theory, we find instead that as a result of a contraction-
ary monetary policy shock agents expect both inflation and output to slow down over
time. In particular, forecasts for prices, production, consumption and investment are all
31Consensus Economics forecasts are only available since 1993. To address issues related to the
short sample, and hence the small number of observations that are available to consistently estimate
LP coefficients, we only calculate BLP IRFs over a 12-month horizon. Responses are estimated using
data from 1999:01 - 2014:12. The years from 1993 to 1999 inform the BLP prior.
32Specifically, the rolling twelve-month-ahead forecasts are computed as
Ftxt+12 =
h
12
Ftxt+h +
12− h
12
Ftxt+12+h,
where Ftxt+h is the h-month-ahead median forecast of variable xmade at time t. The forecasts produced
by the respondents are {Ftxt+h, Ftxt+12+h} with horizons h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 12} and h + 12 months (see
Dovern et al., 2012).
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revised downward, while the opposite holds for unemployment forecasts. Interestingly,
consistent with the literature on the presence of informational frictions, we find that
while the direction of the revision of expectation is in line with a recessionary outlook,
forecasters revise their assessment in a sluggish fashion. Notably, while production falls
by 4% in annual terms, the movement in the forecasts is more gradual over the hori-
zons. Annual CPI inflation drops by 1%, while agents revise their forecasts gradually
downward. This type of behaviour is compatible with information being only partially
and slowly processed over time. Conversely, with full information forecasts should im-
mediately adjust to shocks, and by the same amount as the variable being forecasted
(see discussion in Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012).
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Figure 9: The Effects of MP Shocks
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Figure 10: Yield Curve Response to MP Shocks
h= 0
%
 p
oi
nt
s
 1 2  5 10 20
−0.5
0
0.5
1
h= 1
 1 2  5 10 20
−0.5
0
0.5
1
h= 3
 1 2  5 10 20
−0.5
0
0.5
1
h= 6
 1 2  5 10 20
−0.5
0
0.5
1
h= 12
 1 2  5 10 20
−0.5
0
0.5
1
h= 24
maturity (years)
 1 2  5 10 20
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Note: BLP responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock. Shock identified with the MPShock
series and normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. Sample 1979:01 - 2014:12.
BLP (6) with V AR(12) prior over 1969:01 - 1979:01. Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
VAR and LP responses in Figure C.4.
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Figure 11: Response of Expectations to MP Shocks
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6 Conclusions
What are the effects of monetary policy? Despite being one of the central questions in
macroeconomics, and the numerous theoretical and methodological advances, the dis-
cussion on the effects of monetary policy appears to be still surrounded by a substantial
degree of uncertainty. In fact, not just the magnitude and the significance, but even
the sign of the responses of crucial variables – prices and output being a prime example
– depends on the chosen identification strategy, the sample period, the information set
considered, and the details of the model specification.
This paper helps rationalising unstable and puzzling previous results by using a
novel flexible econometric model that optimally bridges between standard VARs and the
Local Projection approach, and an identification strategy coherent with the intuitions
stemming from models of asymmetric and imperfect information.
Results proposed show that following a monetary tightening economic activity and
prices contract, lending to consumers and businesses cools down, and expectations move
in line with fundamentals. Moreover, the currency appreciates, and equity prices fall.
Finally, the slope of the yield curve flattens, borrowing costs rise and so do corporate
spreads. These effects are both sizeable and persistent, suggesting that monetary policy
is a powerful tool for both economic stabilisation and financial stability. These findings
are robust to a number of severe tests.
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A Derivations
A.1 Aggregate Expectation Revisions
Recall from Section 1 that at
¯
t both agents and the central bank receive signals about the
economy, and as a result of that, update their expectations. Specifically, at opening time
¯
t
each agent i observes a private noisy signal of the state of the economy xt
si,
¯
t = xt + νi,
¯
t , νi,
¯
t ∼ N (0, σn,ν) . (A.1)
Given the signals, agents update their expectations using
Fi,
¯
txt = K1si,
¯
t + (1−K1)Fi,t−1xt , (A.2)
Fi,
¯
txt+h = ρ
hFi,
¯
txt ∀h > 0 , (A.3)
where K1 is the Kalman gain which represents the relative weight placed on new information
relative to previous forecasts. When the signal is perfectly revealing K1 = 1, while in the
presence of noise K1 < 1. Thus (1 − K1) is the degree of information rigidity faced by the
agents. The central bank observes
scb,
¯
t = xt + νcb,
¯
t , νcb,
¯
t ∼ N (0, σcb,ν) . (A.4)
We can assume without loss of generality that the signal observed by the central bank is more
precise than the one observed by agents: σcb,ν < σn,ν . Given the signal, the central bank
updates its expectations via the Kalman filter
Fcb,
¯
txt = Kcbscb,
¯
t + (1−Kcb)Fcb,t−1xt , (A.5)
Fcb,
¯
txt+h = ρ
hFcb,
¯
txt ∀h > 0 , (A.6)
where Kcb is the bank’s Kalman gain.
At t¯ agents observe the policy rate (i.e. a common signal from the central bank) and
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update their forecasts using
Fi,t¯xt = K2s˜cb,t¯ + (1−K2)Fi,txt , (A.7)
Fi,t¯xt+h = ρ
hFi,t¯xt ∀h > 0 , (A.8)
where s˜cb,t¯ indicates the generic public signal that agents extract from the interest rate decision,
and K2 is the Kalman gain given the noise in the public signal ν˜cb,
¯
t.
Combining Eq. (A.7) with Eq. (2), and using Eq. (1) and Eq. (A.8) we find
Fi,t¯xt − Fi,
¯
txt = K2
[
s˜cb,t¯ − Fi,txt
]
= K2(xt + ν˜cb,t¯)−K2
[
K1(xt + νi,t¯) + (1−K1)Fi,t−1xt
]
= K2(1−K1)xt +K2ν˜cb,t¯ −K2K1νi,t¯ −K2(1−K1)Fi,t−1xt
= K2(1−K1)ρ
[
xt−1 − Fi,t−1xt−1
]
+K2
[
(1−K1)ξt + ν˜cb,t¯ −K1νi,t¯
]
. (A.9)
To find an expression for the forecast error
(
xt−1 − Fi,t−1xt−1
)
in Eq. (A.9), first note that
Eq. (A.7) implies
xt − Fi,t¯xt = K−12 (1−K2)
(
Fi,t¯xt − Fi,
¯
txt
)− ν˜cb,t. (A.10)
Then Eq. (A.10) one period earlier can be written as
xt−1 − Fi,t−1xt−1 = K−12 (1−K2)
[
Fi,t−1xt−1 − Fi,t−1xt−1
]
− ν˜cb,t−1
= K−12 (1−K2)ρ−1
[
Fi,t−1xt − Fi,t−1xt
]
− ν˜cb,t−1 . (A.11)
Substituting Eq. (A.11) into Eq. (A.9) yields
Fi,t¯xt − Fi,
¯
txt =(1−K2)(1−K1)
[
Fi,t−1xt − Fi,t−1xt
]
+K2
[
(1−K1)ξt +
(
ν˜cb,t¯ − (1−K1)ρν˜cb,t−1
)
−K1νi,t¯
]
. (A.12)
The characteristics of the common noise ν˜cb,t¯ are derived from the Taylor rule in Eq. (9), and
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the signal extraction problem of the central bank in Eq. (7). Specifically:
it = φ0 + φ
′
xFcb,
¯
txt + ut
= φ0 + φ
′
x
[
Kcbscb,
¯
t + (1−Kcb)Fcb,t−1xt
]
+ ut
= φ0 + φ
′
x
[
Kcbscb,
¯
t + (1−Kcb)ρFcb,t−1xt−1
]
+ ut
= φ0 +Kcbφ
′
xscb,
¯
t + (1−Kcb)ρ(it−1 − φ0 − ut−1) + ut
= [1− (1−Kcb)ρ]φ0 + (1−Kcb)ρit−1 +Kcbφ′xscb,
¯
t − (1−Kcb)ρut−1 + ut , (A.13)
with Fcb,t−1xt−1 = Fcb,t−1xt−1. Thus, conditional on it−1, at announcement agents observe
the common signal
s˜cb,t¯ = xt + νcb,
¯
t +
(
Kcbφ
′
x
)−1
[ut − (1−Kcb)ρut−1] , (A.14)
where
ν˜cb,
¯
t = νcb,
¯
t +
(
Kcbφ
′
x
)−1
[ut − (1−Kcb)ρut−1] . (A.15)
Plugging Eq. (A.15) into Eq. (A.12) yields
Fi,t¯xt − Fi,
¯
txt =(1−K2)(1−K1)
[
Fi,t−1xt − Fi,t−1xt
]
+K2(1−K1)ξt +K2
[(
νcb,t¯ − (1−K1)ρνcb,t−1
)
−K1νi,t¯
]
+K2
(
Kcbφ
′
x
)−1 [
ut − (K1 −Kcb)ρut−1 − ρ(1−K1)(1−Kcb)ρ2ut−2
]
.
(A.16)
Eq. (13) follows by taking the average of Eq. (A.16) over the agents i.
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A.2 Bias in OLS Regression
Recall Eq. (13):
Ft¯xt − F
¯
txt =(1−K2)(1−K1)
[
Ft−1xt − Ft−1xt
]
+K2(1−K1)ξt +K2
[
νcb,
¯
t − (1−K1)ρνcb,t−1
]
+K2(Kcbφ
′
x)
−1 [ut − ρ(K1 −Kcb)ut−1 + (1−K1)(1−Kcb)ρ2ut−2] .
For simplicity, let us consider the vector xt to be univariate. Suppose one runs a regression of
the form (e.g. Table 2)
Ft¯xt − F
¯
txt = β
[
Ft−1xt − Ft−1xt
]
+ errort .
Then, using E[Ft−1xtξt] = 0 and E[Ft−1xtut] = 0 we get
βˆOLS =
E
[
(Ft¯xt − F
¯
txt)(Ft−1xt − Ft−1xt)
]
E
[
(Ft−1xt − Ft−1xt)2
]
=(1−K2)(1−K1)−K2(1−K1)ρ
E
[
(Ft−1xt − Ft−1xt)νcb,t−1
]
E
[
(Ft−1xt − Ft−1xt)2
]
−K2(Kcbφ′x)−1(K1 −Kcb)ρ
E
[
(Ft−1xt − Ft−1xt)ut−1
]
E
[
(Ft−1xt − Ft−1xt)2
] +O(ρ3)
=(1−K2)(1−K1)−K2(1−K1)ρ
E
[
ρFt−1xt−1νcb,t−1
]
E
[
(Ft−1xt − Ft−1xt)2
]
−K2(Kcbφ′x)−1(K1 −Kcb)ρ
E
[
ρFt−1xt−1ut−1
]
E
[
(Ft−1xt − Ft−1xt)2
] +O(ρ3)
=(1−K2)(1−K1)−K2(1−K1)ρ2 ΣνcbE [(Ft−1xt − Ft−1xt)2]
−K2(Kcbφ′x)−1(K1 −Kcb)ρ2
Σu
E
[
(Ft−1xt − Ft−1xt)2
] +O(ρ3) . (A.17)
The size of the last term in Eq. (A.17) depends on the relative magnitude of K1 and Kcb. The
Kalman gain of the agents and the central bank are likely to be similar, due to similar degree
of precision of the signals. Hence, the third term is negligible, resulting in an overall negative
bias.
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B Optimal Prior Tightness
Following Giannone, Lenza and Primiceri (2015), we treat the overall tightness of the prior
λ(h) as an additional model parameter, and estimate it at each horizon h by treating the model
as a hierarchical one. This accounts to specifying a prior probability distribution for each λ(h),
and estimating them as the maximisers of their posterior distribution, conditional on the data.
Specifically, we maximise
p(λ(h)|y(h)) = p(y(h)|λ(h)) · p(λ(h)) , (B.1)
where p(y(h)|λ(h)) is the marginal density of the data as a function of the hyperparameters
p(y(h)|λ(h)) =
∫
p(y(h)|λ(h), θ)p(θ|λ(h))dθ ∀h , (B.2)
and p(θ|λ(h)) is the prior distribution of the remaining model’s parameters conditional on λ(h).
y(h) = vec(Y(h)) where Y (h) ≡ (yp+1+h, . . . , yT )′.
For the hyperpriors p(λ(h)), p = 1, . . . ,H, we choose from a family of Gamma distributions.
This choice allows to retain conjugacy and thus both analytical and computational tractability.
Consistent with the idea that, if present, VAR misspecifications compound as the horizon
grows, we specify the Gamma hyperprior to be more diffuse the larger h.
This is accomplished by choosing the scale and shape parameters of the Gamma in such a
way that the mode of the distribution is fixed at 0.4, and the standard deviation is a Logistic
function of h that reaches its maximum at horizons larger than h = 36. The Logistic function
is specified as follows
sd(λ(h)) = 0.1 + 0.4/[1 + exp(−0.3(h− 12))] ,
and plotted in Figure B.1a. Figure B.1b illustrates the evolution of the hyperprior for λ(h) as
a function of the horizon.
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Figure B.1: Hyperprior for BLP-IRF Coefficients
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(a) Standard deviation of the hyperprior as a Logistic function of h.
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(b) Hyperprior Gamma distributions for a selection of horizons.
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C Other Charts and Tables
Table C.1: Test for Information Frictions – 1994:2009
FF4t FF4
GK
t MPNt
lag 1 0.009
[0.13]
0.419
[5.67]***
-0.059
[-0.67]
lag 2 -0.109
[-1.48]
-0.290
[-3.62]***
0.206
[2.61]**
lag 3 0.040
[0.55]
0.092
[1.14]
0.560
[7.08]***
lag 4 0.085
[1.16]
0.122
[1.47]
0.076
[0.83]
f1,t−1 -0.009
[-1.35]
-0.010
[-2.65]***
-0.146
[-4.58]***
f2,t−1 0.002
[0.75]
0.004
[1.71]*
-0.011
[-0.76]
f3,t−1 -0.003
[-0.77]
-0.005
[-1.38]
-0.041
[-1.87]*
f4,t−1 0.010
[1.30]
0.007
[1.67]*
0.079
[2.53]**
f5,t−1 0.005
[0.68]
0.000
[-0.04]
0.028
[0.83]
f6,t−1 -0.014
[-2.44]**
-0.007
[-2.75]***
0.018
[0.91]
f7,t−1 -0.014
[-1.89]*
-0.011
[-2.38]**
-0.061
[-2.44]**
f8,t−1 0.000
[-0.10]
-0.001
[-0.23]
-0.044
[-1.88]*
f9,t−1 -0.002
[-0.43]
-0.001
[-0.36]
-0.045
[-1.79]*
f10,t−1 0.004
[0.75]
0.001
[0.22]
-0.039
[-2.48]**
r2 0.002 0.132 0.168 0.210 0.282 0.269
F 1.083 1.957 10.205 3.339 16.531 3.532
p 0.366 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 183 189 183 189 159 165
Note: Regressions are estimated over the sample 1994:2009. From left to right, the monthly surprise
in the fourth federal funds future (FF4t), the instrument in Gertler and Karadi (2015) (FF4
GK
t ), the
narrative series of Romer and Romer (2004) (MPNt). t-statistics are reported in square brackets, *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Constant included. Regressions on factors include a lag of the
dependent variable. Robust SE.
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Table C.2: Variables Used
model
Code Variable Name Source log (1) (2) (3) (4)
INDPRO Industrial Production FRED • • • • •
CAPUTLB00004S Capacity Utilization FRED • • • • •
UNRATE Unemployment Rate FRED • • • •
AWHMAN Average Weekly Hours Mfg FRED • •
CES3000000008 Average Earnings Manufacturing FRED • •
CPIAUCSL CPI All Items FRED • • • • •
PCEPI PCE Deflator FRED • • •
HOUST Housing Starts FRED • •
PERMIT Building Permits FRED • •
BUSINVx Business Inventories FRED • •
M2SL M2 Money Stock FRED • •
BUSLOANS Business Loans FRED • • •
DTCTHFNM Consumer Loans FRED • • •
RPI Real Personal Income FRED • •
DDURRA3M086SBEA Real Consumption: Durable Goods FRED • •
DNDGRA3M086SBEA Real Consumption: Nondurable Goods FRED • •
S&P 500 S&P 500 FRED • • •
TB3MS 3M T-Bill FRED •
CRBPI Commodity Price Index CRB • • • •
EBP GZ Excess Bond Premium FRB • • • •
DGS1 1Y Treasury Rate FRED • • •
DGS2 2Y Treasury Rate FRED •
DGS5 5Y Treasury Rate FRED •
DGS10 10Y Treasury Rate FRED •
DGS20 20Y Treasury Rate FRED •
YCSLOPE Term (10Y-1Y Rate) Spread FRED •
OECDEXP Exports of Goods OECD • •
OECDIMP Imports of Goods OECD • •
BISREER Real Effective Exchange Rate BIS • •
BASPREAD BAA-AAA Spread FRED •
MTGSPREAD Mortgage Spread (10Y Treasury) GK •
CSHPI Case Shiller House Price Index DATASTREAM • •
CFGDP Expected Gross Domestic Product CE •
CFPCE Expected Personal Consumption CE •
CFINV Expected Business Investment CE •
CFPROD Expected Industrial Production CE •
CFCPI Expected Consumer Prices CE •
CFURATE Expected Unemployment Rate CE •
CF3MRATE Expected 3M Interest Rate CE •
Models: (1) Baseline set for tests in Sections 3 and 4; (2) Channels of monetary transmission in Figure
9; (3) Expectation channel in Figure 11; (4) Interest rate channel in Figure 10. Sources: Federal
Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Commodity Research Bureau (CRB), Federal Reserve Board (RFB),
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Bank for International Settlements
(BIS), Gertler and Karadi (2015) (GK), Thomson Reuters (DATASTREAM), Consensus Economics
(CE).
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Figure C.1: Informationally-robust instrument for monetary policy
shocks: Crisis Episodes
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Note: market-based surprises conditional on private agents’ information set FF4t (orange line), residual
to Eq. (16) MPIt, (blue, solid). Shaded areas denote NBER recessions. left panel: 2001:01 - 2003:12.
right panel: 2007:01 - 2009:12.
Figure C.2: blp responses: Lag Length
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BLP (2) (teal, dashed), BLP (6) (orange, dash-dotted) and BLP (12) (blue, solid) impulse responses.
V AR(12) prior. Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage bands.
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Figure C.3: IRFs to Monetary Policy Shock: all Variables, all
Methods
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Note: BLP, VAR and LP responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock. Shock identified with
the MPIt series and normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. Sample 1979:01 -
2014:12. BLP (6) with V AR(12) prior over 1969:01 - 1979:01. Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage
bands.
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Figure C.4: IRFs to Monetary Policy Shock: Interest Rates, all
Methods
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(a) Interest rates responses across horizons.
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(b) Interest rates responses across maturities.
Note: BLP, VAR and LP responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock. Shock identified with
the MPIt series and normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. Sample
1979:01 - 2014:12. BLP (6) with V AR(12) prior over 1969:01 - 1979:01. Shaded areas are 90%
posterior coverage bands. 66
Figure C.5: IRFs to Monetary Policy Shock: Private Expectations, all
Methods
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Note: BLP, VAR and LP responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock. Shock identified with
the MPIt series and normalised to induce a 100 basis point increase in the 1-year rate. Sample 1999:01 -
2014:12. BLP (6) with V AR(12) prior over 1993:01 - 1999:01. Shaded areas are 90% posterior coverage
bands.
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